THE EMPEROR'S POWER IN TEMPORAL MATTERS Are All Parts Of The World Subject To The Emperor In Temporals? Opinion 2: The Roman Emperor Is Not Now Lord Of All Nations CHAPTER 6

BELBELLO DA PAVIA, 

Luchino Visconti Hours c. 

1390, completed c. 1430

THE EMPEROR'S POWER IN TEMPORAL MATTERS 

Are all parts of the world subject to the Emperor in temporals? 

Opinion 2: The Roman Emperor is not now lord of all nations 

CHAPTER 6

Student Relate a different opinion.

Master Another opinion is that although the emperor of the Romans was once the lord of the whole world, yet now he is not the lord of all nations.

Student Would you try to bring forward some arguments for that opinion.

Master A first argument for that opinion is as follows. What the pope approves we also ought to approve and hold as true (dist. 19, c. Si Romanorum [c.1, col.58]). But the pope seems to approve the assertion of the Franks and others who assert that they are not subject to the Roman empire. For if he did not approve their opinion he should not have decreed anything about their assertion, especially anything that sounds like approval of their assertion. But, as we read in Extra, De privilegiis, c. Super specula [c.28, col.868], because Franks and others remove themselves from the Roman empire and do not use imperial laws the pope decreed that civil law should not be taught or heard in Paris, or in neighbouring cities or other places. This seems to sound like approval of the above assertion of the Franks and others. Therefore we should approve that same assertion and regard it as true.

Student Perhaps others would say that the pope did not make such a statute because he approved that assertion of the Franks but because he wanted the learned to pursue theology more and because he would have issued in vain a statute insinuating that he did not approve of that assertion because the Franks and others would not have abandoned their own opinion on that account.

Master It seems to others that that reply does not obstruct the previous argument, because the pope, to whom the correcting of all sins and errors belongs, should have implied that he did not approve the said assertion, if it is false.

Master It seems to others that that reply does not obstruct the previous argument, because the pope, to whom the correcting of all sins and errors belongs, should have implied that he did not approve the said assertion, if it is false.

Master [2] Another argument is as follows. Saints canonised by the church should not be believed to have given way to mortal sin or blameworthy rebellion or any wrong. But there have been many saintly kings and others who have not recognised the emperor as their superior in temporal affairs and have finished their days with this opinion. Examples are St. Louis king of the Franks and many kings of England. Therefore they truly were not subject to the Roman empire.

Student Perhaps others would say that those saintly men did not know that they were subject to the Roman empire and if they had known this they would have recognised it in deed and in word. They could be excused, therefore, through ignorance of the civil law.

Master It appears to some that this reply is not adequate, because kings and princes are bound to know whether they have a superior or not. Moreover, ignorance of that which someone is bound to know does not excuse (1, q. 4, para. Notandum {c.12, col.422]. Therefore kings and princes are not excused by such ignorance.

Student Perhaps some people would say that those kings and princes were not bound to have such knowledge of civil law and history as to know that they were subject to the Roman empire.

Master It is still objected that they should have sought to learn from others if they did not know themselves, as the gloss on dist. 38, para. 1 [[I can't find this quote, although the subject of the dist. is ignorance of the law]] attests when it says, "No one is excused by ignorance who can have a supply of knowledgable men."

Student To this it might be said that they did not find learned men who would instruct them in this because many learned men desire the destruction of the Roman empire more than its exaltation, and simple men, as much as they can, inform them that not all mortals are subject to the Roman empire. It is not appropriate, however, that kings and princes and other laity be too solicitous in inquiring whether they are subject to the Roman empire, as the gloss on 1, q. 4, para. Notandum [col.587] attests when it says, "For it to be said with probability that someone errs, he is not required to be too careful, scrupulous and thoughtful in inquiring, nor be too negligent and lax in not inquiring." And so in this matter kings and other laity could have been excused by ignorance although they did not recognise that they were subject to the Roman empire.

Master It is objected against this that kings and princes especially ought to be greatly solicitous of the common good, although they ought not be too careful, scrupulous and thoughtful. But the common good of the whole human race depends on the Roman empire. In connection with it, therefore, kings and princes are bound to exhibit the greatest care .

Student Bring forward another argument if one occurs to you.

Master [3] A further argument for the above opinion is as follows. It belongs above all to the office of the highest pontiff to instruct the laity, and especially kings and princes on whom the salvation of others depends, in matters that pertain to faith, justice and good morals. But if all mortals are subject by right to the Roman empire, kings and princes who refuse to be subjected to the Roman empire are acting against justice. The highest pontiffs, therefore, should have been carefully instructing kings and princes about this matter. However, even many holy highest pontiffs did not do this, and yet they would have done so if it pertained to justice. For otherwise they would not have been solicitous about the common good and the salvation of those for whom they will render an account to God. It is not probable, therefore, that all mortals are now subject to the Roman empire.

Student It seems that this argument can be obstructed in two ways. (i) [It is obstructed] in one way by saying that the highest pontiffs did not know that all mortals should be subjected to the Roman empire. For this pertains to civil law. They are not bound to be learned in the civil law, however, and they are not bound to teach the faithful in those matters that pertain to the civil law. (ii) In another way it can be said that the highest pontiffs perceived that kings, princes and many other laity in no way wished to give assent to anyone announcing to them that they ought to be subject to the Roman empire. And therefore they were silent in accordance with what Solomon says in Proverbs 23:9, "Do not speak in the hearing of fools. For they will despise the wisdom of your words."

Master It seems to some people that neither of those replies obstructs the aforesaid argument. (i) The first does not because it is not probable that the highest pontiffs did not know, if it is true, that everyone is subject to the Roman empire, especially since the glossators on the decretals, which the highest pontiff ought not be unaware of, seem clearly to assert this. [It also does not] because although the highest pontiff is not bound to have an excellent knowledge of the civil law, yet he ought not be wholly ignorant of all that is in the civil law, indeed he is bound to know those things which affect the whole totality of mortals. For otherwise he could not correct Christians for many mortal sins which redound to the danger of the whole church, because he ought not correct them for those things which he does not know to be sins. Since it so affects everyone, therefore, whether all mortals are subject to the Roman empire that whoever knowingly refuses to be subject to the Roman empire, if he is subject to it, sins mortally, the highest pontiff ought not to be unaware of this, because he ought to know of those things which are done by many people and communally whether they are mortal sins or not.

It seems that (ii) the second reply also does not obstruct that argument. For it was not evident to the highest pontiffs that all the laity who did not subject themselves to the Roman empire were so obstinate that they did not in any way want to be informed about the truth. They should at least have tested, therefore, whether they were willing to receive true teaching in this matter.Again, it is certain that there were many holy kings and princes and many other laity who loved justice and the common good of the church and hated all injustice. For otherwise all kings, princes and other laity would have been lovers of wickedness and consequently would have been in a state of damnation. Therefore they would have been prepared to be informed about any matter of justice pertaining to them. And consequently they were prepared to be instructed whether they were by right subject to the Roman empire or were wholly free from subjection of that kind.

[4] Further, those who are in truth subject in law to the Roman empire and yet refuse to be subject in fact, possess nothing justly, because such people do not possess anything by right of the emperor. He who possesses nothing by right of the emperor, however, and yet is subject to the emperor possesses nothing justly, as Augustine attests when he says in [his commentary] on John, as found in dist. 8, c. Quo iure [c.1, col.12], "By human law one says, `This is my villa, this is my servant, this is my house.' Human laws, however, are the laws of the emperors. ... Remove the laws of the emperors and who would dare to say, `This is my villa, this is my servant, this is my house'? ... Do not say, `What is the king to me?' What therefore is your possession to you? Possessions are possessed by the laws of kings. Have you said, `What is the king to me'? Do not say `your possessions', because you have renounced those human laws by which possessions are possessed." And Augustine says the same thing to Vincent, as we read in 23, q. 7, c. 1 [col.950], "Any earthly thing can not rightly be possessed by anyone except either by divine law, by which all things belong to the just, or by human law, which is in the power of the kings of the earth." We gather from these [texts] that no one subject to the emperor or to a king possesses anything justly except by the law of the emperors or the king. And consequently if all nations are by right subject to the Roman empire, no king, prince or other layman who renounces the laws of the emperors and does not want to be subject to the emperor possesses anything justly. Hence the gloss on dist. 1, c. Ius Quiritum [col. 6] says, as was brought forward above, "He who does not want to be under the Roman empire can have neither an inheritance nor the other things that are reckoned here as of Roman law." All kings, princes and other laity, therefore, who refuse to be under the Roman empire possess nothing justly. If they possess nothing justly, however, they can not, from everything they do possess, give alms or give anything to anyone or [make] public offerings or sacrifices at the altar, because although alms can be given from certain goods acquired illicitly, from which nevertheless an offering or sacrifice can not be made, yet none of those things can be done from things possessed unjustly which do not belong to the possessor. Therefore the church and all clerics and religious sin if they openly receive, except at a time of necessity, alms, gifts, offerings or sacrifices from those things which kings, princes and other laity who refuse to be subjected to the Roman empire possess in fact and not in law