Dante's Letter To Cangrande I della Scala The Roman Emperor's Right-Hand Man: Autopsy On Can Grande Reveal That He Was Murdered By The Pope With Foxglove!

Foxglove

(1) To the munificent and most victoroius Lord, the Lord Can Grande della Scala, Victor-General of the most holy principality of Caesar in the city of Verona, and town of Vicenza, his most devoted servant, Dante Alighieri, a Florentine by birth, not by disposition, prayeth long and happy life, and perpetual increase of the glory of his name.

(2) The illustrious renown of your Magnificence, which wakeful Fame spreads abroad as she flies, affects divers persons in divers ways, so that some it uplifts with the hope of good fortune, while others it casts down with the dread of destruction. The report whereof, overtopping all deeds of recent times, I erstwhile did deem extravagant, as going beyond the appearence of truth.

(3) But that continued uncertainty might not keep me longer in suspense, even as the Queen of the South sought Jerusalem, and as Pallas sought Helicon, so did I seek Verona, in order to examine with my own trusty eyes the things of which I had heard. And there was I witness of your splendour, there was I witness and partaker of your bounty; and whereas I had formerly suspected the reports to be somewhat unmeasured, I afterwards recognized that it was the facts themselves that were beyond measure. Whence it came to pass that whereas through hearsay alone, with a certain subjection of mind, I had previously become well disposed towards you, at the first sight of you I became your most devoted servant and friend.

(4) Nor do I think that in assuming the name of friend I shall lay myself open to a charge of presumption, as some perchance might object; inasmuch as unequals no less than equals are united by the sacred tie of friendship. For if one should examine friendships which have been pleasant and profitable, it will be evident that in many cases the bond has been between persons of superior station and their inferiors.

(5) And if our attention be directed to true friendship for its own sake, shall we not find that the friends of illustrious and mighty princes have many a time been men obscure in condition but of distinguished virtue? Why not? since even the friendship of God and man is in no wise impeded by the disparity between them.

(6) But if any man consider this assertion unseemly, let him hearken to the Holy Spirit when it declares that certain men have been partakers of its friendship. For in Wisdom we read, concerning wisdom: 'For she is a treasure unto men that never faileth; which they that use are partakers of the friendship of God'.

(7) But the common herd in their ignorance judge without discernment; and even as they imagine the sun to be a foot across, so they judge with regard to questions of conduct; and they are deceived by their foolish credulity with regard to both the one and the other matter. But it does not become us, to whom it has been given to know what is best in our nature, to follow in the footsteps of the common herd; nay, rather are we bound to oppose their errors. For those who have vigour of intellect and reason, being endowed with a certain divine liberty, are not restricted by precedent. Nor is this to be wondered at, for it is not they who receive direction from the laws, but rather the laws them.

(8) It is manifest, therefore, that what I said above, namely that I was your most devoted servant and friend, in no wise savours of presumption.

(9) Esteeming, then, your friendship as a most precious treasure, I desire to preserve it with assiduous forethought and anxious care.

(10) Therefore, since it is a doctrine of ethics that friendship is equalized and preserved by reciprocity, it is my wish to preserve due reciprocity in making a return for the bounty more than once conferred upon me. For which reason I have often and long examined such poor gifts as I can offer, and have set them out separately, and scrutinized each in turn, in order to decide which would be the most worthy and the most acceptable to you.

(11) And I have found nothing more suitable even for your exalted station than the sublime cantica of the Comedy which is adorned with the title of Paradise; this, then, dedicated to yourself, with the present letter to serve as its superscription, I inscribe, offer, and in fine commend to you.

(12) Nor does the simple ardour of my affection permit me to pass over in silence the consideration that in this offering there may seem to be greater honour and fame conferred on the patron than on the gift; the rather that in the address I shall appear to such as read with attention to have given utterance to a forecast as to the increase of the glory of your name -- and this of set purpose.

(13) But eagerness for your favour, for which I thirst, heedless of envy, will urge me forward to the goal which was my aim from the first. And so, having made an end of what I had to say in epistolary form, I will now in the capacity of commentator essay a few words by way of introduction to the work which is offered for your acceptance.

(14) As the Philosopher says in the second book of the Metaphysics, 'as a thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth'; the reason of which is, that the truth concerning a thing, which consists in the truth as in its subject, is the perfect likeness of the thing as it is.

(15) Now of things which exist, some are such as to have absolute being in themselves; while others are such as to have their being dependent upon something else, by virtue of a certain relation, as being in existence at the same time, or having respect to some other thing, as in the case of correlatives, such as father and son, master and servant, double and half, the whole and part, and other similar things, in so far as they are related.

(16) Inasmuch, then, as the being of such things depends upon something else, it follows that the truth of these things likewise depends upon something else; for if the half is unknown, its double cannot be known; and so of the rest.

(17) If any one, therefore, is desirous of offering any sort of introduction to part of a work, it behooves him to furnish some notion of the whole of which it is a part. Wherefore I, too, being desirous of offering something by way of introduction to the above-mentioned part of the whole Comedy, thought it incumbent on me in the first place to say something concerning the work as a whole, in order that access to the part might be the easier and the more perfect.

(18) There are six points, then, as to which inquiry must be made at the beginning of every didactic work; namely, the subject, the author, the form, the aim, the title of the book, and the branch of philosophy to which it belongs. Now of these six points there are three in respect of which the part which I have had in mind to address to you differs from the whole work; namely, the subject, the form, and the title; whereas in respect of the others there is no difference, as is obvious to any one who considers the matter. Consequently, in an examination of the whole, these three points must be made the subject of a separate inquiry; which being done, the way will be sufficiently clear for the introduction to the part.

(19) Later we will examine the other three points, not only with reference to the whole work, but also with reference to the particular part which is offered to you.

(20) For the elucidation, therefore, of what we have to say, it must be understood that the meaning of this work is not of one kind only; rather the work may be described as 'polysemous', that is, having several meanings; for the first meaning is that which is conveyed by the letter, and the next is that which is conveyed by what the letter signifies; the former of which is called literal, while the latter is called allegorical, or mystical [or moral, or anagogical].

(21) And for the better illustration of this method of exposition we may apply it to the following verses: 'When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a people of strange language; Judah was his sanctuary, and Israel his dominion'. For if we consider the letter alone, the thing signified to us is the going out of the children of Israel from Egypt in the time of Moses; if the allegory, our redemption through Christ is signified; if the moral sense, the conversion of the soul from the sorrow and misery of sin to a state of grace is signified ; if the anagogical, the passing of the sanctified soul from the bondage of the corruption of this world to the liberty of everlasting glory is signified.

(22) And although these mystical meanings are called by various names, they may one and all in a general sense be termed allegorical, inasmuch as they are different (diversi) from the literal or historical; for the word 'allegory' is so called from the Greek alleon, which in Latin is alienum (strange) or diversum (different).

(23) This being understood, it is clear that the subject, with regard to which the alternative meanings are brought into play, must be twofold. And therefore the subject of this work must be considered in the first place from the point of view of the literal meaning, and next from that of the allegorical interpretation.

(24) The subject, then, of the whole work, taken in the literal sense only, is the state of souls after death, pure and simple. For on and about that the argument of the whole work turns.

(25) If, however, the work be regarded from the allegorical point of view, the subject is man according as by his merits or demerits in the exercise of his free will he is deserving of reward or punishment by justice.

(26) And the form is twofold -- the form of the treatise, and the form of the treatment. The form of the treatise is threefold, according to the threefold division. The first division is that whereby the whole work is divided into three cantiche; the second, whereby each cantica is divided into cantos; and the third, whereby each canto is divided into rhymed lines.

(27) The form or manner of treatment is poetic, fictive, descriptive, digressive, and figurative; and further, it is definitive, analytical, probative, refutative, and exemplificative.

(28) The title of the book is 'Here begins the Comedy of Dante Alighieri, a Florentine by birth, not by disposition'. For the understanding of which it must be noted that 'comedy' is so called from comos, a village, and oda, a song; whence comedy is as it were a 'rustic song'.

(29) Now comedy is a certain kind of poetical narration which differs from all others. It differs, then, from tragedy in its subject-matter, in that tragedy at the beginning is admirable and placid, but at the end or issue is foul and horrible. And tragedy is so called from tragos, a goat, and oda ; as it were a 'goat-song', that is to say foul like a goat, as appears from the tragedies of Seneca. Whereas comedy begins with sundry adverse conditions, but ends happily, as appears from the comedies of Terence. And for this reason it is the custom of some writers in their salutation to say by way of greeting: 'a tragic beginning and a comic ending to you!'

(30) Tragedy and comedy differ likewise in their style of language; for that of tragedy is high-flown and sublime, while that of comedy is unstudied and lowly. And this is implied by Horace in the Art of Poetry, where he grants that the comedian may on occasion use the language of tragedy, and vice versa: 'Yet sometimes comedy her voice will raise, And angry Chremes scold with swelling phrase; And prosy periods oft our ears assail When Telephus and Peleus tell their tragic tale'.

(31) And from this it is clear that the present work is to be described as a comedy. For if we consider the subject-matter, at the beginning it is horrible and foul, as being Hell; but at the close it is happy, desirable, and pleasing, as being Paradise. As regards the style of language, the style is unstudied and lowly, as being in the vulgar tongue, in which even women-folk hold their talk. And hence it, is evident why the work is called a comedy.

(32) And there are other kinds of poetical narration, such as the pastoral poem, the elegy, the satire, and the votive song, as may also be gathered from Horace in the Art of Poetry; but of these we need say nothing at present.

(33) It can now be shown in what manner the subject of the part offered to you is to be determined. For if the subject of the whole work taken in the literal sense is the state of souls after death, pure and simple, without limitation; it is evident that in this part the same state is the subject, but with a limitation, namely the state of blessed souls after death.

(34) And if the subject of the whole work from the allegorical point of view is man according as by his merits or demerits in the exercise of his free will he is deserving of reward or punishment by justice, it is evident that in this part this subject has a limitation, and that it is man according as by his merits he is deserving of reward by justice.

(35) In like manner the form of the part is determined by that of the whole work. For if the form of the treatise as a whole is threefold, in this part it is twofold only, the division being that of the cantica and of the cantos.

(36) The first division (into cantiche) cannot be applicable to the form of the part, since the cantica is itself a part under the first division.

(37) The title of the book also is clear. For the title of the whole book is 'Here begins the Comedy', &c., as above; but the title of the part is 'Here begins the third cantica of the Comedy of Dante, which is called Paradise'.

(38) These three points, in which the part differs from the whole, having been examined, we may now turn our attention to the other three, in respect of which there is no difference between the part and the whole. The author, then, of the whole and of the part is the person mentioned above, who is seen to be such throughout.

(39) The aim of the whole and of the part might [be] manifold; as, for instance, immediate and remote. But leaving aside any minute examination of this question, it may be stated briefly that the aim of the whole and of the part is to remove those living in this life from a state of misery, and to bring them to a state of happiness.

(40) The branch of philosophy to which the work is subject, in the whole as in the part, is that of morals or ethics; inasmuch as the whole as well as the part was conceived, not for speculation, but with a practical object.

(41) For if in certain parts or passages the treatment is after the manner of speculative philosophy, that is not for the sake of speculation, but for a practical purpose; since, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Metaphysics: 'practical men occasionally speculate on things in their particular and temporal relations'.

(42) Having therefore premised these matters, we may now apply ourselves to the exposition of the literal meaning, by way of sample; as to which it must first be understood that the exposition of the letter is in effect but a demonstration of the form of the work.

(43) The part in question then, that is, this third cantica which is called Paradise, falls by its main division into two parts, namely the prologue, and the executive part; which second part begins: 'Surge ai mortali per diverse foci'.

(44) As regards the first part, it should be noted that although in common parlance it might be termed an exordium, yet, properly speaking, it can only be termed a prologue; as the Philosopher seems to indicate in the third book of his Rhetoric, where he says that 'the proem in a rhetorical oration answers to the prologue in poetry, and to the prelude in flute-playing'.

(45) It must further be observed that this preamble, which may ordinarily be termed an exordium, is one thing in the hands of a poet, and another in those of an orator.

(46) For orators are wont to give a forecast of what they are about to say, in order to gain the attention of their hearers. Now poets not be only do this, but in addition they make use of some sort of invocation afterwards.

(47) And this is fitting in their case, for they have need of invocation in a large measure, inasmuch as they have to petition the superior beings for something beyond the ordinary range of human powers, something almost in the nature of a divine gift.

(48) Therefore the present prologue is divided into two parts: in the first is given a forecast of what is to follow; in the second is an invocation to Apollo; which second part begins: 'O buono Apollo, all'ultimo lavoro', &c.

(49) With reference to the first part it must be observed that to make a good exordium three things are requisite, as Tully says in his New Rhetoric; that the hearer, namely, should be rendered favourably disposed, attentive, and willing to learn; and this is especially needful in the case of a subject which is out of the common, as Tully himself remarks.

(50) Inasmuch, then, as the subject dealt with in the present work is out of the common, it is the aim of the first part of the exordium or prologue to bring about the above-mentioned three results with regard to this out-of-the-way subject. For the author declares that he will relate such things as he who beheld them in the first heaven was able to retain.

(51) In which statement all those three things are comprised; for the profitableness of what he is about to be told begets a favourable disposition in the hearer; its being out of the common engages his attention; and its being within the range of possibility renders him willing to learn. Its profitableness he gives to be understood when he says that he shall tell of that which above all things excites the longing of mankind, namely the joys of Paradise; its uncommon nature is indicated when he promises to treat of such exalted and sublime matters as the conditions of the celestial kingdom; its being within the range of possibility is demonstrated when he says that he will tell of those things which he was able to retain in his mind -- for if he was able, so will others be also.

(52) All this is indicated in the passage where he declares that he had been in the first heaven, and that he purposes to relate concerning the celestial kingdom whatsoever he was able to store up, like a treasure, in his mind. Having thus noted the excellence and perfection of the first part of the prologue, we may now proceed to the literal exposition.

(53) He says, then, that 'the glory of the First Mover', which is God, 'shines forth in every part of the universe', but in such wise that it shines 'in one part more and in another less'.

(54) That it shines in every part both reason and authority declare. Reason thus: Everything which exists has its being either from itself, or from some other thing. But it is plain that self-existence can be the attribute of one being only, namely the First or Beginning, which is God, since to have being does not argue necessary self-existence, and necessary self-existence appertains to one being only, namely the First or Beginning, which is the cause of all things; therefore everything which exists, except that One itself, has its being from some other thing.

(55) If, then, we take, not any thing whatsoever, but that thing which is the most remote in the universe, it is manifest that this has its being from something; and that from which it derives either has its being from itself, or from something else. If from itself, then it is primal; if from something else, then that again must either be self-existent, or derive from something else. But in this way we should go on to infinity in the chain of effective causes, as is shown in the second book of the Metaphysics.

(56) So we must come to a primal existence, which is God. Hence, mediately or immediately, everything that exists has its being from Him, because, inasmuch as the second cause has its effect from the first, its influence on what it acts upon is like that of a body which receives and reflects a ray; since the first cause is the more effective cause.

(57) And this is stated in the book On Causes, namely, that 'every primary cause has influence in a greater degree on what it acts upon than any second cause'. So much with regard to being.

(58) With regard to essence I argue in this wise: Every essence, except the first, is caused; otherwise there would be more than one necessarily self-existent being, which is impossible. For what is caused is the effect either of nature or of intellect; and what is of nature is, consequently, caused by intellect, inasmuch as nature is the work of intelligence. Everything, then, which is caused is the effect, mediately or immediately, of some intellect.

(59) Since, then, virtue follows the essence whose virtue it is, if the essence is of intellect, the virtue is wholly and solely of the intellectual essence whose effect it is. And so, just as we had to go back to a first cause in the case of being, so now we must do so in the case of essence and of virtue.

(60) Whence it is evident that every essence and every virtue proceeds from a primal one; and that the lower intelligences have their effect as it were from a radiating body, and, after the fashion of mirrors, reflect the rays of the higher to the one below them. Which matter appears to be discussed clearly enough by Dionysius in his work On the Celestial Hierarchy.

(61) And therefore it is stated in the book On Causes that 'every intelligence is full of forms'. Reason, then, as we have seen, demonstrates that the divine light, that is to say the divine goodness, wisdom, and virtue, shines in every part.

(62) Authority likewise declares the same, but with more knowledge. For the Holy Spirit says by the mouth of Jeremiah: 'Do not I fill heaven and earth?' And in the Psalm: 'Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? and whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I descend into hell, thou art there also. If I take my wings,' &c. And Wisdom says: 'The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world'. And Ecclesiasticus, in the forty-second chapter: 'His work is full of the glory of the Lord'.

(63) To which also the writings of the pagans bear witness; for Lucan says in his ninth book: 'Jupiter is whatever thou seest, wherever thou goest'.

(64) He says well, then, when he says that the divine ray, or divine glory, 'penetrates and shines through the universe'; penetrates, as to essence; shines forth, as to being.

(65) And what he adds as to 'more and less' is manifestly true, since we see that one essence exists in a more excellent degree, and another in a less; as is clearly the case with regard to the heaven and the elements, the former being incorruptible, while the latter are corruptible.

(66) And having premised this truth, he next goes on to indicate Paradise by a circumlocution; and says that he was in that heaven which receives the glory of God, or his light, in most bountiful measure.

(67) As to which it must be understood that that heaven is the highest heaven, which contains all the bodies of the universe, and is contained by none, within which all bodies move (itself remaining everlastingly at rest), and which receives virtue from no corporeal substance.

(68) And it is called the Empyrean, which is as much as to say, the heaven glowing with fire or heat; not that there is material fire or heat therein, but spiritual, which is holy love, or charity.

(69) Now, that this heaven receives more of the divine light than any other can be proved by two things. Firstly, by its containing all things, and being contained by none; secondly, by its state of everlasting rest or peace.

(70) As to the first the proof is as follows: The containing body stands in the same relation to the content in natural position as the formative does to the formable, as we are told in the fourth book of the Physics. But in the natural position of the whole universe the first heaven is the heaven which contains all things; consequently it is related to all things as the formative to the formable, which is to be in the relation of cause to effect. And since every causative force is in the nature of a ray emanating from the first cause, which is God, it is manifest that that heaven which is in the highest degree causative receives most of the divine light.

(71) As to the second the proof is this: Everything which has motion moves because of something which it has not, and which is the terminus of its motion. The heaven of the moon, for instance, moves because of some part of itself which has not attained the station towards which it is moving; and because no part whatsoever of it has attained any terminus whatsoever (as indeed it never can), it moves to another station, and thus is always in motion, and is never at rest, which is what it desires. And what I say of the heaven of the moon applies to all the other heavens, except the first. Everything, then, which has motion is in some respect defective, and has not its whole being complete.

(72) That heaven, therefore, which is subject to no movement, in itself and in every part whatsoever of itself has whatever it is capable of having in perfect measure, so that it has no need of motion for its perfection. And since every perfection is a ray of the Primal One, inasmuch as He is perfection in the highest degree, it is manifest that the first heaven receives more than any other of the light of the Primal One, which is God.

(73) This reasoning, however, has the appearance of an argument based on the denial of the antecedent, in that it is not a direct proof and according to syllogistic form. But if we consider its content it is a good proof, because it deals with a thing eternal, and assumes it to be capable of being eternally defective; so that, if God did not give that heaven motion, it is evident that He did not give it material in any respect defective.

(74) And on this supposition the argument holds good by reason of the content; and this form of argument is much the same as though we should reason: 'if he is man, he is able to laugh'; for in every convertible proposition a like reasoning holds good by virtue of the content. Hence it is clear that when the author says 'in that heaven which receives more of the light of God', he intends by a circumlocution to indicate Paradise, or the heaven of the Empyrean.

(75) And in agreement with the foregoing is what the Philosopher says in the first book On Heaven, namely that 'a heaven has so much the more honourable material than those below it as it is the further removed from terrestrial things'.

(76) In addition to which might be adduced what the Apostle says to the Ephesians of Christ: 'Who ascended up far above all heavens, that He might fill all things'. This is the heaven of the delights of the Lord; of which delights it is said by Ezekiel against Lucifer: 'Thou, the seal of similitude, full of wisdom, beautiful in perfection, wast in the delights of the Paradise of God'.

(77) And after he has said that he was in that place of Paradise which he describes by circumlocution, he goes on to say that he saw certain things which he who descends therefrom is powerless to relate. And he gives the reason, saying that 'the intellect plunges itself to such depth' in its very longing, which is for God, 'that the memory cannot follow'.

(78) For the understanding of which it must be noted that the human intellect in this life, by reason of its connaturality and affinity to the separate intellectual substance, when in exaltation, reaches such a height of exaltation that after its return to itself memory fails, since it has transcended the range of human faculty.

(79) And this is conveyed to us by the Apostle where he says, addressing the Corinthians: 'I know a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell; God knoweth) how that he was caught up to the third heaven, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter'. Behold, after the intellect had passed beyond the bounds of human faculty in its exaltation, it could not recall what took place outside of its range.

(80) This again is conveyed to us in Matthew, where we read that the three disciples fell on their faces, and record nothing thereafter, as though memory had failed them. And in Ezekiel it is written: 'And when I saw it, I fell upon my face'. And should these not satisfy the cavillers, let them read Richard of St.Victor in his book On Contemplation ; let them read Bernard in his book On Consideration; let them read Augustine in his book On the Capacity of the Soul ; and they will cease from their cavilling.

(81) But if on account of the sinfulness of the speaker they should cry out against his claim to have reached such a height of exaltation, let them read Daniel, where they will find that even Nebuchadnezzar by divine permission beheld certain things as a warning to sinners, and straightway forgot them.

(82) For He 'who maketh his sun to shine on the good and on the evil, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust', sometimes in compassion for their conversion, sometimes in wrath for their chastisement, in greater or lesser measure, according as He wills, manifests his glory to evil-doers, be they ever so evil.

(83) He saw, then, as he says, certain things 'which he who returns has neither knowledge nor power to relate'. Now it must be carefully noted that he says 'has neither knowledge nor power' -- knowledge he has not, because he has forgotten; power he has not, because even if he remembers, and retains it thereafter, nevertheless speech fails him.

(84) For we perceive many things by the intellect for which language has no terms -- a fact which Plato indicates plainly enough in his books by his employment of metaphors; for he perceived many things by the light of the intellect which his everyday language was inadequate to express.

(85) Afterwards the author says that he will relate concerning the celestial kingdom such things as he was able to retain; and he says that this is the subject of his work; the nature and extent of which things will be shown in the executive part. (86) Then when he says: 'O buono Apollo', &c., he makes his invocation. And this part is divided into two parts -- in the first, he invokes the deity and makes a petition; in the second, he inclines Apollo to the granting of his petition by the promise of a certain recompense; which second part begins: 'O divina virtù'.

(87) The first part again is divided into two parts--in the first, he prays for divine aid; in the second, he adverts to the necessity for his petition, whereby he justifies it; and this part begins: 'Infino a qui l'un giogo di Parnaso', &c.

(88) This is the general meaning of the second part of the prologue; the particular meaning I shall not expound on the present occasion; for anxiety as to my domestic affairs presses so heavily upon me that I must perforce abandon this and other tasks of public utility. I trust, however, that your Magnificence may afford me the opportunity to continue this useful exposition at some other time.

(89) With regard to the executive part of the work, which was divided after the same manner as the prologue taken as a whole, I shall say nothing either as to its divisions or its interpretation at present; save only that the process of the narrative will be by ascent from heaven to heaven, and that an account will be given of the blessed spirits who are met with in each sphere; and that their true blessedness consists in the apprehension of Him who is the beginning of truth, as appears from what John says: 'This is life eternal, to know thee the true God', &c.; and from what Boethius says in his third book On Consolation: 'To behold thee is the end'. Hence it is that, in order to reveal the glory of the blessedness of those spirits, many things which have great profit and delight will be asked of them, as of those who behold the fullness of truth.

(90) And since, when the Beginning or First, which is God, has been reached, there is nought to be sought for beyond, inasmuch as He is Alpha and Omega, that is, the Beginning and the End, as the Vision of John tells us, the work ends in God Himself, who is blessed for evermore, world without end. Dante Princeton Project

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